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Note
ARTIFICIAL GRASSROOTS ADVOCACY AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF LEGISLATIVE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL MEASURES
JONATHAN C. ZELLNER
Modern lobbying is rife with campaigns that claim to be the fruit of
spur-of-the-moment grassroots activity.
Despite their outward
appearance, these campaigns mask the fact that their sponsors include
special interest groups, large corporations, and affluent individuals. They
likewise strive to further the objectives of these entities and individuals
while purporting to promote the public interest. Because the parties
behind these pseudo-grassroots efforts enjoy vast financial and political
resources, their activities have exerted a significant effect on public
opinion and on the decisions of elected officials. In recent years, Congress
has sought to rein in the architects of so-called “Astroturf” lobbying
through proposed registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements.
Nevertheless, concerns over the First Amendment ramifications of such
legislation have thwarted its passage.
This Note begins by considering the First Amendment-based
arguments of those who oppose legislative efforts to address Astroturf
lobbying. It thereafter examines case law on lobbying disclosure rules,
and on similar rules in the area of election-related speech, and finds that,
despite the above arguments, the government has a compelling interest in
the disclosure of Astroturf lobbying activities. Finally, this Note analyzes
the components of the Senate’s most recent disclosure proposal and
discusses ways by which Congress could strengthen subsequent proposals.
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ARTIFICIAL GRASSROOTS ADVOCACY AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF LEGISLATIVE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL MEASURES
JONATHAN C. ZELLNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For many United States citizens and citizen-groups, grassroots
advocacy represents an essential medium through which they may exercise
their First Amendment freedoms of speech, petition, association, and the
press. Grassroots efforts inform elected leaders of where constituents
stand on proposed government action, or lack thereof, thus enabling
individuals and coalitions to contribute to the public discourse on issues of
importance.1 But while a common notion of grassroots advocacy may be
of small community rallies or demonstrations, in reality, many advocates
are persons and alliances with the ability to raise or spend prodigious sums
to convey their message—in effect, parties more appropriately described as
“grassroots lobbyists.” This may in part explain the recent observation that
“grassroots advocacy . . . is booming.”2
With expensive grassroots lobbying campaigns, however, comes the
issue of authenticity. Many examples of such campaigns from recent years
illustrate that they often are not the kind of genuine spontaneous activity
indicative of grassroots advocacy. In 2002, with revenue of over $25
million, the United Seniors Association (USA) ran a multi-million-dollar
advertising campaign to influence the outcomes of congressional races in
favor of candidates who backed Medicare prescription drug legislation that
the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
similarly supported.3 USA claimed it had a nationwide activist network of
* Hamilton College, B.A. 2008; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.
I would like to thank Professor Leslie Levin for her suggestions and guidance throughout the writing
process. I would also like to thank the staffs of Volumes 42 and 43 of the Connecticut Law Review for
their hard work and encouragement. This Note is dedicated to my parents, brother, and grandparents
for their everlasting love, wisdom, and support. Any and all errors herein are mine and mine alone.
1
See Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik M. Zimmerman, Weeding Them Out by the Roots: The
Unconstitutionality of Regulating Grassroots Issue Advocacy, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 164, 197
(2008) (“Through grassroots issue advocacy, average citizens—and the organizations that they
support—are able to inform public officials of their support for government action that they believe
will be beneficial and of their opposition to government action that they believe will be detrimental.”).
2
Jim Snyder, Town Halls Underscore Grassroots Secrecy, Critics Say, THE HILL, Aug. 10, 2009,
available at http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/54149-town-halls-underscore-grassroots-secrecycritics-say. While it is difficult to estimate how much grassroots lobbyists spend—since there is no
federal requirement for them to divulge their expenses—some think it may be greater than the $3
billion spent on direct lobbying. Id.
3
PUB. CITIZEN, ORGANIZING ASTROTURF: EVIDENCE SHOWS BOGUS GRASSROOTS GROUPS
HIJACK THE POLITICAL DEBATE; NEED FOR GRASSROOTS LOBBYING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 7
(2007), available at http://www.cleanupwashington.org/documents/astroturf.pdf.
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1.5 million, but copies of its tax filings showed that it received more than
$20 million from one donor in 2002.4 Moreover, PhRMA itself rendered
monetary assistance to USA that same year; a spokesman for the trade
association stated that it had given USA an “unrestricted educational
grant.”5 Three years earlier, the company Century Strategies had run a
grassroots campaign—with “call-to-action phone calls,” targeted mail,
rallies, and petitions—to arouse public opposition to pro-gambling
measures in Mississippi.6 It received its $4 million in funding, though,
from a group of Mississippi Choctaw who operated a casino and wanted to
suppress competition.7
More recent advocacy events have likewise shown an apparent lack of
spontaneous organization, most notably some of the early “Tea Party”
protests. Following CNBC pundit Rick Santelli’s call, in February 2009,
for a “‘Chicago Tea Party’” to oppose President Obama’s mortgage bailout
plan, numerous websites dedicated to the cause sprang to life, each
supposedly part of a national grassroots Internet protest and each tied to the
Sam Adams Alliance advocacy group.8 This group in turn enjoyed
substantial financial support from the Koch family, multibillionaire owners
of one of the largest privately-held corporations in the United States, and
FreedomWorks, a public relations firm with former House Majority leader
Dick Armey as its chairman, and which the Kochs have funded.9
Additionally, certain backers of President Obama’s healthcare plan may
themselves have engaged in similar behavior. Organizing for America, the
Service Employees International Union, and Health Care for America
Now, staunch promoters of the plan, allegedly urged hordes of their

4

Id.
Id.
6
S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., “GIMME FIVE”—INVESTIGATION OF TRIBAL
LOBBYING
MATTERS
24–26
[hereinafter
“GIMME
FIVE”],
available
at
http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Report.pdf.
7
PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 5. The Choctaw tribe was a client of now-convicted lobbyist
Jack Abramoff, who, in addition to coordinating the anti-gambling campaign, ultimately received a
large percentage of the Choctaws’ funds for use in entities he controlled as well as pet projects.
“GIMME FIVE,” supra note 6, at 34–38.
8
Mark Ames & Yasha Levine, The Rick Santelli “Tea Party” Controversy: Article Kicks Up a
Media Dust Storm, ALTERNET (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.alternet.org/module/printversion/129656.
9
See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Tea Parties Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A21 (“In
particular, a key role is being played by FreedomWorks, an organization run by Richard Armey, the
former House majority leader . . . .”); Ames & Levine, supra note 8 (arguing that the Tea Parties were
mostly a “sophisticated PR campaign” for the Koch family, and that the Sam Adams Alliance “took
pains to scrub . . . deep links to . . . Koch family money”). One of the Kochs later appeared to take
credit for helping to kick-start the protests. See David Weigel, Tea Party Patrons Point New Recruits
Toward 2010, WASH. INDEP. (Oct. 5, 2009, 12:27 AM), http://washingtonindependent.com/62318/teaparty-patrons-point-new-recruits-toward-2010 (noting that, at an Americans for Prosperity-sponsored
summit, David Koch “took credit for launching [Americans for Prosperity],” which, like
FreedomWorks, played a major role in “shepherding the Tea Parties”).
5
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supporters to rally against the Parties, suggesting that some of the
counterprotests were not organic grassroots activity either.
The above examples highlight a phenomenon more widely known as
“Astroturfing,” or fake grassroots advocacy, a practice that has become
popular among particular groups and individuals. In short, Astroturfing
refers to the efforts of paid lobbyists to conduct a political or public
relations campaign on behalf of a client, typically an interest group,
designed in such a way as to mask its origins and create the impression that
it is spur-of-the-moment grassroots behavior.11 Despite its apparent
popularity, however, Astroturfing retains questionable characteristics. As
the illustrations suggest, it relies heavily on misrepresentation, and in many
cases does not advance the interests of the general public. Distinguishing
this form of advocacy from the more traditional bottom-up form, though,
can be challenging where the law essentially allows Astroturfers to conduct
their activities alongside genuine issue advocates, as it presently does,
without requiring at least some degree of accountability.12
This Note contends that Congress needs to act to expose and control
Astroturf lobbying, and that it can without stifling the First Amendment
rights of everyday issue advocates. Part II describes the tactics of
Astroturfing at greater length, expanding on the above-mentioned
problematic aspects of the practice. From there, it lays out the primary
First Amendment-based arguments against legislative efforts to expose and
control Astroturfing. Part III introduces United States v. Harriss,13 in
which the Supreme Court upheld grassroots lobbying disclosure laws as a
means of addressing fake grassroots lobbying, and argues that the
government has a compelling interest in combating Astroturfing through
such laws. In doing so, Part III finds that such laws do not, or will not,
substantially encroach on or eviscerate the First Amendment rights of true
grassroots issue advocates, as critics of reform claim. Part III likewise
asserts that employing disclosure laws to address Astroturfing is consistent
with the aims of the “marketplace of ideas” concept—chiefly that of open,
transparent public discourse—as illustrated by analogous disclosure
provisions in the realm of election-related speech. Finally, Part IV
analyzes potential registration, reporting, and disclosure solutions,
observing that requirements of the kind Congress proposed in 2007 serve
as a practical starting place for the laws that should take effect.

10
Dan Eggen & Philip Rucker, Loose Network of Activists Drives Reform Opposition, WASH.
POST, Aug. 16, 2009, at A01; Ryan Sager, Op-Ed., Keep Off the Astroturf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009,
at A27.
11
See Part II.A.1 infra, for a fuller discussion of the term “Astroturfing.”
12
As Part II.A.2 infra argues, current federal lobbying laws do little to capture the activities of
Astroturf lobbyists.
13
347 U.S. 612 (1954).
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II. ASTROTURF LOBBYING AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS OVER
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO EXPOSE AND CONTROL IT
Artificial grassroots advocacy is not novel. Courts and elected leaders
alike have been aware of it for some time. Part A expands on the
description of Astroturfing, tracing the origin of its name and discussing
the tactics of the practice. Part B then sets forth critical objections to
legislative efforts to address Astroturfing, including the contention that
such efforts will ultimately chill the activity of true grassroots advocates
and thus interfere considerably with their First Amendment liberties.
A. Origins, Characteristics, and Treatment of “Astroturfing”
1. Term Origins and Practice Techniques
The forerunners to present-day Astroturfing existed in the United
States at least as early as World War I.14 By the time the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Harriss15 in the middle of the twentieth century, it
understood the activity which constitutes Astroturfing. The use of the term
“Astroturfing” to describe this type of activity, however, would not come
into existence until the mid-1980s. Former Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen
appears responsible for first uttering the term. In 1985, describing a
“‘mountain of cards and letters’” he received promoting what looked like
positions reflecting the interests of insurance companies, the Senator
remarked, “‘A fellow from Texas can tell the difference between grass
roots and Astroturf. . . . [T]his is generated mail.’”16 Senator Bentsen was
referring to AstroTurf, the synthetic grass-like substance used as surface
material for playing fields.
Parties that engage in Astroturfing attempt to give officials the
impression that significant public support for or opposition to a stance on a
political issue exists when, in actuality, such concern may be lacking
altogether.17 Because Astroturf efforts seek to pose as spontaneous
grassroots movements, though, they do not necessarily depend on whether
citizen activists have already spoken out in favor of or against proposed
14

See Kathy R. Fitzpatrick & Michael J. Palenchar, Disclosing Special Interests: Constitutional
Restrictions on Front Groups, 18 J. PUB. REL. RES. 203, 206 (2006) (noting that the “modern history of
front groups”—entities commonly employed in Astroturf lobbying—traces to approximately 1913).
15
347 U.S. 612 (1954).
16
Sager, supra note 10.
17
See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 565 n.205 (2007) (“The term ‘astroturf’ lobbying was
coined to describe lobbyist efforts to orchestrate a fake, or less than completely accurate, showing of
citizen support for a particular policy position, at the grassroots level . . . .”); Gary Weiss, Astroturfing
Congress, FORBES.COM (Feb. 13, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/02/12/muckrakerastroturf-congress-opinion-cx_gw_0213muckraker_print.html (“The aim [of Astroturfing] is simple: to
deceive Congress and regulatory agencies into believing that there is a groundswell of public concern
about their pet issues.”).
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government action.
In other words, Astroturf lobbying seeks to
“manufacture” support for the views it expresses, regardless of whether
citizens already support those positions.19 This generally involves
mimicking the characteristics of grassroots advocacy by adopting the
strategies that smaller, constituent-led grassroots campaigns employ,
including letters to elected leaders, phone calls, and mass e-mails.20
For the most part, the persons and coalitions behind Astroturf
movements are not everyday citizens or entities with modest financial
resources and limited political connections. Rather, the architects of these
campaigns, and their clients, include powerful individuals and special
interest groups with the ability to raise or contribute copious amounts of
money, and who enjoy strong ties with influential political figures.21 In
addition, to disguise their identities, the persons and entities who engage in
Astroturfing create separate coalitions and front groups that conduct the
actual lobbying.22 This lobbying frequently consists of advertising the
client’s positions and persuading constituents to telephone or write their
representatives in support of these positions.23 Astroturf lobbying may also
consist of an organization or a special interest group dispatching paid
agents to publicly pose as “‘concerned citizens.’”24
Because of these tendencies, Astroturf lobbying strives to encourage
constituents and politicians to support positions which reflect the interests
of large corporations, trade organizations, and affluent individuals—
interests which the public at large may not necessarily share.25 The United

18
See, e.g., Ramón Castellblanch, Challenging Pharmaceutical Industry Political Power in
Maine and Vermont, 28 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 109, 126 (2003) (explaining that Astroturf
operations “mimic grassroots lobbying” and that Astroturf lobbyists “[do not use] public opinion . . . as
they find it”).
19
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 559 (2008) (noting that Astroturf lobbying involves “[the generation of] fake or
at least short-lived and shallow public support for its position”).
20
See, e.g., Castellblanch, supra note 18, at 126 (“Astroturf lobbying is the top-down fabrication
of the outpourings of letters, faxes, e-mails, phone calls, and personal visits characteristic of bottom-up
grassroots campaigns.”); Weiss, supra note 17 (“Like genuine grass-roots groups, Astroturf
organizations bring forth a blizzard of letters, phone calls and e-mails.”).
21
PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 1–2; see also Gary D. Bass, Citizens Have a Right To Know
About Lobbying Efforts, ROLL CALL, May 16, 2007, available at http://www.ombwatch.org/
files/npadv/gbassopedrollcall05162007.pdf (noting that “phony ‘grass-roots’ organizations . . . are
really front groups for private, wealthy interests”).
22
Press Release, OMB Watch, Distortions and Misinformation Continue to Abound in Grassroots
Lobbying Disclosure Debate (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/print/3203.
23
Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 565 n.205.
24
Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583,
2659 n.341 (2008) (citing JOHN C. STAUBER & SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR YOU
79 (1995)).
25
See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that the parties behind Astroturf movements have
little in common with the ordinary citizens they claim to represent); see also Ann Bartow, Book
Review, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 449, 459–60 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006))

364

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:357

Seniors Association and Century Strategies, for instance, sought to (and
did) build support for positions that advanced the goals of the
pharmaceutical industry and a casino operator.26 On some occasions,
though, even nonprofit organizations—such as Planned Parenthood—
resort to Astroturfing to accomplish certain aims. The New York Times
reported in 2003 that one branch of Planned Parenthood disseminated form
letters to editors at publications throughout the country “that look[ed] like
authentic grass-roots responses from readers but [were] not.”27 The
organization’s Web site featured pre-made letters and urged visitors to
combine segments of the letters and to send the newly-created documents
to publications.28
To build support for their messages, Astroturfers must instill in citizens
the belief that their activities represent genuine grassroots efforts. To
facilitate trust, they sometimes give the front groups and affiliated alliances
they create innocuous-sounding names which do not seem to reflect any
particular position. The lobbyists for PhRMA did this in creating the
United Seniors Association. In other instances, however, Astroturf
lobbyists resort to more overt misrepresentation, operating under names
that suggest the opposite of the group’s intended goals. One such group,
the Save Our Species Alliance (SOSA), campaigned in 2005 in favor of a
House bill that, if adopted, would have removed provisions of the
Endangered Species Act mandating preservation of habitat areas for
endangered species.29 SOSA’s executive director and head lobbyist had
longstanding connections with the timber industry.30 Similarly, Project
Protect, a group which lobbied in support of the Healthy Forests
Restoration Act of 2003—a law calling for the thinning of fire-prone
forests in Western states to combat conflagrations, and which authorizes
the removal of larger, commercially valuable trees instead of just
vulnerable brush and undergrowth31—served as a front group for loggers.32
As a result, many costly Astroturf campaigns have proven effective in
(“[Astroturfing] is a corrupting influence on open and honest debate.”); Weiss, supra note 17
(“Astroturf groups have a corrosive effect on public opinion.”).
26
See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text; “GIMME FIVE,” supra note 6, at 10; Barbara T.
Dreyfuss, Poison Pill: How Abramoff’s Cronies Sold the Medicare Drug Bill, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov.
2006, at 23, 26–29.
27
Jennifer 8. Lee, Editors and Lobbyists Wage High-Tech War over Letters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2003, at C10.
28
Id.
29
PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 7.
30
Weiss, supra note 17.
31
See Wildfires in Western Forests, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/
land/forests/pfires.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (observing that the legislation was “a codeword for
commercial exploitation”).
32
See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 6–7 (noting that, in 2004, Project Protect listed an address
that matched that of the American Forest Resource Council, a lobbying group for pro-industry land
management policies, and that Project Protect’s organizer later participated in the SOSA campaign).
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influencing public opinion. In the 1990s, health insurance companies spent
$17 million on televised advertisements opposing President Clinton’s plan
for national healthcare reform, which they filtered through front groups.33
The advertisements marshaled opposition to the plan and ultimately helped
defeat it.34 Similarly, during the 2000 election cycle, Citizens for Better
Medicare, a pharmaceutical-industry front group, spent $65 million on
issue advertisements in a successful attempt to prevent Congress from
enacting Medicare drug benefit reform.35 The advertisements suggested
that legislation could amount to “‘big government in [your] medicine
cabinet’” and urged the public to “‘[l]et Congress know you support the
right Medicare reforms.’”36 Furthermore, in the early 1990s, a large public
relations firm, with funding from the Kuwaiti government, created a front
group that drummed up considerable support for U.S. military intervention
in the Persian Gulf following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.37
2. Organizational and Legislative Treatment of Astroturf Lobbying
Public relations organizations view Astroturfing as a practice in which
their members should not participate. The Public Relations Society of
America (PRSA) states in its code of ethics that its members must “[b]e
honest and accurate in all communications,” “[r]eveal the sponsors for
causes and interests represented,” and “[a]void deceptive practices.”38
PRSA’s code also lists as improper conduct instances where a member
“implements ‘grass roots’ campaigns or letter-writing campaigns to
legislators on behalf of undisclosed interest groups” or “deceives the public
by employing people to pose as volunteers to speak at public hearings and
participate in ‘grass roots’ campaigns.”39 The International Public
Relations Association (IPRA) likewise states in its code of ethics that its
members “[shall n]ot create any organization to serve an announced cause
but which actually serves an undisclosed [special or private] interest.”40
And although the Public Affairs Council has no official codified position
33

Weiss, supra note 17.
STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 24, at 97–98; Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 209;
Weiss, supra note 17.
35
Vicky Lankarge, Denying Coverage Before the Fact, MARKET WATCH (July 26, 2001, 1:52
PM), http://www.Marketwatch.com/story/story/print?guid=0AA2F523-0CE2-4EED-84770B0F6A2E3366; PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 6.
36
Robert Pear, Drug Company Ads Attack Medicare Coverage of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1999, at A18.
37
STAUBER & RAMPTON, supra note 24, at 167–71. Kuwait’s government allegedly funded as
many as twenty public relations firms and lobbying groups to generate support for the use of force
against Iraq. Id. at 169.
38
Code of Ethics, PUB. RELATIONS SOC’Y AM. (2000), http://www.prsa.org/AboutPRSA/
Ethics/CodeEnglish/.
39
Id.
40
Code of Venice, INT’L PUB. RELATIONS ASS’N (2009), http://www.ipra.org/detail.asp?
articleid=21. IPRA’s code also states that members must give “a faithful representation” of the
organizations they serve. Id.
34
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on Astroturfing, it has discouraged the use of the practice, noting that the
grassroots community frowns upon it.41 In addition, some states and
municipalities have formally prohibited lobbyists from creating the false
appearance of public support for (or opposition to) particular government
action.42
But while certain organizations, states, and cities have taken steps to
dissuade lobbyists from employing pseudo-grassroots techniques in their
advocacy efforts, the federal government has not approached the matter as
proactively. Federal lobbying laws, in particular the amended Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995,43 govern the registration of lobbyists, the reporting
of direct lobbying activities, and the disclosure of contributors. Yet, they
do not mandate that grassroots lobbyists register with the government,
disclose who contributes to their campaigns and in what amounts, or report
how much they spend and on what activities44—thus availing Astroturfers
of the benefits of exemption. Those who strictly engage in efforts to
stimulate grassroots advocacy can hence avoid disclosure regardless of the
extent of their “‘grassroots lobbying’” activities and regardless of the
amount of funding or compensation they obtain to carry out their
activities.45 Although drafts of the Lobbying Disclosure Act featured
provisions requiring registration of Astroturf lobbyists and reports on their
actions and contributors, the drafting committee did not include them in the
final bill.46 In 2007, Congress again considered implementing registration
and reporting standards for grassroots lobbyists—as part of the Senate’s
proposed Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2007.47
Again, however, the bill enacted into law contained no sections on
41

Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 221. The Public Affairs Council official in charge of
grassroots efforts adds that lobbyists who resort to Astroturfing hurt their ability to forge working
relationships with lawmakers. Id.
42
Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2006).
43
Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (1995) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–12 (2006)
(amended 2007).
44
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1602–04 (2006); see also Jill E. Fisch, How Do
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1564 (2005) (observing that
existing laws do not require the disclosure of efforts to generate grassroots lobbying activity); Jim
Drinkard, Lawmakers Move To Cut Lobbyists’ Influence, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2006, at 6A (same);
see also Meredith McGehee, Lobby Reform as Window Dressing, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4
(2006) (citing the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal for the observation that, if certain advocacy conduct
qualifies as grassroots lobbying, the possibility exists for “expenditures in the millions [to go]
undisclosed to the American people”).
45
JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33794, GRASSROOTS LOBBYING:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 1–2 (2007).
46
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) testified before a House committee that, by the time of the bill’s
passage, “[e]very reference to grass roots lobbying—and even to paid efforts to stimulate artificial
grass roots lobbying—[had] been deleted.” Overhauling the Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 104th Cong. (1995)
(testimony of Sen. Levin).
47
S. 1, 110th Cong. § 220 (2007).
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grassroots lobbying; a floor amendment, introduced due to concerns over
the potential reach of the grassroots lobbying provisions, resulted in their
excision.48
Without registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements, persons
and entities to whom current lobbying laws would otherwise apply can
continue to evade them by posing as issue advocates, limiting what the
public may learn about them and their activities. For those who oppose
attempts to address Astroturfing through grassroots lobbying legislation,
however, the above results protect grassroots activists from governmental
intrusions into their First Amendment liberties and their ability to freely
advocate. As the following text shows, critics of grassroots lobbying laws
have presented a host of reasons relating to speech, petition, association,
and press concerns for why, from their perspective, such laws are
unconstitutional.
B. Arguments Against Legislative Efforts To Identify and Control
Astroturf Lobbying
1. Statutory Overbreadth and the Chilling Effect of Legislation on
First Amendment Rights
Critics of legislative efforts to shine light on Astroturf lobbying have
argued that grassroots lobbying laws are, or will be, overbroad. While
federal statutes designed to address Astroturfing may achieve the desired
goal of exposing sham grassroots campaigns, opponents believe that they
will also draw within their scope genuine issue advocates. After the Senate
removed the grassroots lobbying sections of the Lobbying Transparency
and Accountability Act, former Representatives Christopher Shays and
Marty Meehan introduced a House bill providing for the reporting of
Astroturfing.49 The bill mandated that lobbyists who engaged in “‘paid
communications campaigns to influence the general public to lobby
Congress’” were to report lobbying expenditures in excess of $100,000
over a three-month interval and income from clients exceeding $50,000
during the same period.50 Critics have opined that, under a scheme such as
this, grassroots activists could trigger disclosure simply by spending the
requisite amount of money within the specified timeframe.51 Some have
claimed that this could occur without engagement in substantial lobbying
48
William V. Luneburg & A.L. Spitzer, The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995: Scope of
Coverage, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 43, 59 (William V. Luneburg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009); Thomas
M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals Since 1955, in
THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra, at 23, 36.
49
H.R. 2093, 110th Cong. (2007).
50
Id. § 1(b)(2)(A)(iii), (d)(1)(C); Tory Newmyer, Grass-Roots Lobby Disclosure Draws Fire,
ROLL CALL, May 2, 2007, available at http://www.rollcall.com/issues/52_118/lobbying/18273-1.html.
51
Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 174.
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activities, such as through an issue advertisement campaign designed to
alert citizens to prospective government action.52
Of greater concern regarding possibly overbroad legislation, though, is
the potential consequence of provisions stipulating that parties who engage
in grassroots lobbying report the sources from which they derive financial
or logistical support. Legislation opponents have maintained that the
disclosure aspects of the House-proposed Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act of 2006, which were identical to those of the Lobbying
Transparency and Accountability Act, contained language sufficiently
broad to sweep everyday issue advocates within the bill’s reach.53
Allegedly, any person or group that “‘voluntarily’ communicates [its]
views on any ‘issue’ to any ‘[f]ederal official,’” or “‘encourages other
members of the general public to do the same’” would have needed to
register with the government and to disclose the identities of its
contributors.54 Accordingly, critics assert, these kinds of statutory
provisions could result in a chilling effect on the First Amendment rights
of issue advocates in one of two ways. For groups that espouse unpopular
or inflammatory opinions, revealing their identities to the public could
ostracize them from their fellow constituents.55 It could also result in
reprisal from powerful officials who take offense to these views.56 But
even if their ideologies are not especially divisive, grassroots campaigners
may incur criminal sanctions for failure to report funding—if such
penalties attach for noncompliance.57 In either case, opponents of
grassroots lobbying legislation attest that issue advocates may find it best
to refrain from advocacy entirely.58
52
See Caroline Fredrickson & Douglas Johnson, Citizens Don’t Need “Protection” from
Lobbying, ROLL CALL, May 10, 2007, available at http://www.nrlc.org/freespeech/
RollCallFredricksonJohnson.html (arguing that grassroots advocates could spend more than $100,000
in less than three months via several full-page newspaper advertisements or a small campaign aimed at
arousing public awareness, in even a small number of districts, of an upcoming congressional vote).
53
FREE SPEECH COAL., INC., THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF
GRASSROOTS LOBBYING 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.freespeechcoalition.org/pdfs/
FSCGrassrootsLobbying2.pdf.
54
See id. at 3–4 (quoting a bill that the House of Representatives introduced to identify paid
efforts to encourage grassroots activity).
55
Abraham Lincoln Found. et al., Coalition Letter to Members of the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Urging the Opposition to Efforts To Regulate Grassroots
Lobbying (Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Coalition Letter], http://www.aclu.org/print/free-speech/
coalition-letter-members-subcommittee-constitution-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-urgi.
56
Fredrickson & Johnson, supra note 52.
57
See ACLU, ACLU Letter to the Senate Urging Support of the Bennett Amendment to Senate
Bill 1 (Jan. 17, 2007) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], http://www.aclu.org/print/free-speech/aclu-lettersenate-urging-support-bennett-amendment-senate-bill-1.
58
E.g., Coalition Letter, supra note 55; ACLU Letter, supra note 57; see also Ron Smith,
Compelled Cost Disclosure of Grass Roots Lobbying Expenses: Necessary Government Voyeurism or
Chilled Political Speech?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 117 (1996) (arguing that grassroots
disclosure laws may render it difficult for citizens “to discuss government issues with public officials
without fear of being hauled into court . . . or fined for attempts to otherwise peacefully and lawfully
influence [government] officials”).
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Because of this supposed capacity for silencing issue advocates, critics
argue that grassroots lobbying legislation cannot withstand the close
scrutiny with which courts review laws that infringe on, or may infringe
on, the exercise of political expression.59 The Supreme Court has noted
that, “[w]hen a law burdens core political speech,” it must be “narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding [governmental] interest” to survive.60 In
this respect, the Court has suggested that laws that significantly burden
issue advocacy may not stand in the absence of a compelling governmental
interest, because such activities are inherently political and implicate the
First Amendment speech, association, press, and petition rights of
advocates.61
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., the Supreme Court considered a claim that the advocacy actions of
several railroad companies breached the Sherman Antitrust Act’s antitrade-monopolization provisions,62 violations of which were punishable by
fine, imprisonment, or both.63 The activity at issue in Noerr involved a
publicity campaign that railroad companies initiated to stifle competition
from the motor freight industry, the contents of which “[were] made to
appear as spontaneously expressed views of independent persons and civic
groups.”64 The Court did not find the statute unconstitutional with respect
to the defendants’ actions, but it did hold that “no violation of the Act
[could] be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws.”65 While the defendants’ campaign may have hurt
the business of the plaintiff truckers, the Court noted that efforts to
influence legislation may inevitably inflict some injury on the interests of
the party against whom they are directed.66 Thus the Court found that,
under “close scrutiny,” it could not apply the Sherman Act to the
59
See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (observing that “a limitation on political
expression [is] subject to exacting scrutiny”).
60
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)).
61
See id. at 346–47 (noting that discussion of public issues, the qualifications of political
candidates, and issue-based elections, among other examples of political expression, receive the
broadest First Amendment defense); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961) (suggesting that activities which comprise “mere solicitation of governmental
action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws” involve the right of petition); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (finding that laws restricting the ability of “groups engaged in
the dissemination of ideas” to publish and circulate their ideas would thereby restrict freedom of
expression); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (observing that group
association promotes effective issue advocacy and that “state action which may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny”); see also Sekulow & Zimmerman,
supra note 1, at 165 (“Legislation that regulates or prohibits grassroots issue advocacy violates the First
Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”).
62
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129.
63
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1958).
64
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129–30.
65
Id. at 135.
66
Id. at 142–44.

370

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:357

defendants’ activities, for doing so, and rendering the activities illegal,
would be equivalent to outlawing them.67
The same standard of review may apply to laws which indirectly affect
grassroots activity, such as expenditure-reporting rules. In Buckley v.
Valeo,68 the Supreme Court upheld federal restrictions on the size of
campaign contributions as well as requirements that candidates running for
office and individual donors who contributed above a certain dollarthreshold file reports of contributions and expenditures.69 In doing so, the
Court applied strict scrutiny, or what it referred to as “exacting scrutiny.”70
The Court noted that it had never before suggested that the dependence of
a communication on the spending of money reduced the exacting scrutiny
with which the Court analyzed laws burdening First Amendment rights.71
It also noted that this standard of review is necessary even where the risk
of First Amendment encroachment is indirect in nature.72
Courts have previously ruled against disclosure laws where advocates
could demonstrate that revelation of certain information would
substantially deter them from participation in advocacy and other political
activities, and where this deterrent effect appeared to outweigh the aims of
disclosure. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Supreme Court
overturned an Alabama state court contempt citation against the NAACP
for the organization’s failure to disclose membership lists for its Alabama
branch in order “to do business” in the state.73 The state’s reason for
seeking disclosure of the membership lists was to determine whether the
NAACP was conducting intrastate business in Alabama in violation of the
state’s foreign corporation registration statute.74 The Court found that the
NAACP had persuasively shown that, on past occasions, disclosure of the
identities of its members had subjected these individuals to antagonistic
treatment, including reprisals, loss of employment, threats of violence, and
“other manifestations of public hostility.”75 From the Court’s perspective,
compelled disclosure was likely to convince existing members to leave the
NAACP and to discourage others from joining. The Court held that
Alabama’s asserted interest in disclosure did not justify “the deterrent
67

Id. at 142–45.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
69
Id. at 23, 35, 74–75, 82.
70
Id. at 16, 64–65.
71
Id. at 16.
72
See id. at 65 (“This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of
First Amendment rights arises . . . indirectly as an unintended . . . result of the government’s conduct in
requiring disclosure.”).
73
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 452–54, 467 (1958). The petitioners did
not object to divulging the identities of NAACP employees and persons who held official positions
within the organization, or to Alabama’s interest in acquiring this information, but refused to disclose
the identities of the organization’s ordinary rank-and-file members. Id. at 463–64.
74
Id. at 464.
75
Id. at 462.
68
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effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate” that would likely
result from the NAACP having to divulge its membership lists.76 The
Court reached a similar conclusion two years later in Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 77 another case involving the NAACP.
At the state level, the Supreme Court of Montana in Montana
Automobile Ass’n v. Greely78 invalidated sections of a ballot initiative
broadening the coverage of Montana’s lobbying act. The measure added to
the act’s definition of “‘unprofessional conduct’ . . . ‘[efforts] to influence
the action of any public official on any measure’” through “‘the promise of
support or opposition at any future election.’”79 It also required that
organizations that made annual payments in excess of $1,000 “‘to solicit,
directly, indirectly or by an advertising campaign, the lobbying efforts of
another person,’” disclose the amounts spent on lobbying activities.80 The
measure further required the disclosure of payments for the printing and
The petitioners hinted that
distribution of specific publications.81
disclosure would influence some of them to abstain from issue advocacy,
such as ceasing publication of newsletters.82 The court held that this
consequence, as well as the court’s finding that the lobbying-activitiesdisclosure section was overly vague,83 justified the conclusion that the
provisions were unconstitutional.84
2. Violation of the First Amendment Principle of Anonymity
An additional, and somewhat related, argument against the use of
legislative efforts to identify and control Astroturfing implicates the
alleged constitutional right to speak and publish anonymously.
Anonymous speech and writing has a long history in the United States; the
authors of the Constitution “were favorably disposed toward
pseudonymous authorship,” and anonymous speech and literature were
76

Id. at 462–63, 466.
361 U.S. 516 (1960). The Court found that “the municipalities . . . failed to demonstrate a
controlling justification for the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the
membership lists would cause.” Id. at 527. The petitioners had cited “‘the anti-NAACP climate in
[Arkansas]’” as the reason for their refusal to disclose the names of the organization’s members and
contributors, maintaining that such revelation might lead to harassment, economic reprisals, and even
bodily harm. Id. at 520.
78
632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981).
79
Id. at 304.
80
Id. at 306, 310.
81
Id. at 309.
82
Id. One example of an organizational action that the initiative indicated would trigger
disclosure was the “[m]ailing of newsletters by an organized church to members and nonmembers
encouraging the reader to contact a public official on an abortion law.” Id. at 306.
83
Compare id. at 304–05, 307–08 (holding that lobbying statutes may be void for vagueness, and
that the lobbying-activities-disclosure section was impermissibly vague), with Kimbell v. Hooper, 665
A.2d 44, 47 (Vt. 1995) (finding that “[l]aws regulating . . . political activities [such as lobbying] in a
neutral, noncensorial manner will be stricken as overbroad only as a last resort”).
84
Greely, 632 P.2d at 307–09.
77

372

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:357

common during the Revolutionary War and in the early days of the
Republic.85 Opponents of grassroots lobbying legislation therefore
maintain that the Constitution secures for citizens the freedom to speak,
publish, and advocate anonymously, and that the Supreme Court has
endorsed this principle by recognizing the interest of citizens in
safeguarding themselves from ridicule, embarrassment, and retaliation.86
Opponents likewise contend that the registration and reporting provisions
of grassroots lobbying legislation, like the suggested amendments to the
Lobbying Disclosure Act, would hamper the ability of issue advocates “to
anonymously organize and gather citizen support for a cause.”87
Decisions such as Patterson and Bates underscore a willingness on the
part of the Supreme Court to protect anonymity in public fora where a
legitimate threat of harassment and violence exists.88 This notion of
protection may also apply to cases where the risk of hostility toward parties
who wish to remain anonymous is not as evident. For instance, Talley v.
California89 involved a Los Angeles city ordinance that required persons
who publicly circulated handbills within the city to include on the handbill
their name and address and the names and addresses of the parties who
sponsored the document.90 The petitioner had disseminated flyers urging
readers to boycott businesses that carried products from companies that
would not offer equal employment opportunities to minorities.91 He did
this without including his name and address on the documents, and
received a fine as a result. In reviewing the ordinance, the Court found that
the identification requirement “would tend to restrict freedom to distribute
information and thereby freedom of expression,” and cited Patterson and
Bates for the observation that “identification and fear of reprisal might
deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.”92
While the petitioner did not argue that revelation of his identity would
cause him to worry about his personal safety, and withdraw from his
activities, the Court nonetheless declared the ordinance void, suggesting
that such a circumstance was not out of the question.93
85
Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right
To Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 187–88 (1993).
86
E.g., FREE SPEECH COAL., INC., supra note 53, at 7.
87
Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 178.
88
See William V. Luneburg, Anonymity and Its Dubious Relevance to the Constitutionality of
Lobbying Disclosure Legislation, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 80–81 (2008) (observing that the
petitioners in Patterson and Bates had clearly shown that harassment and other adverse consequences
would result if they were to disclose membership lists, and that the Court committed itself to protecting
the anonymity of advocates in cases such as these).
89
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
90
Id. at 60–61.
91
Id. at 61–62.
92
Id. at 64–65.
93
See id. at 65 (noting that, given the aforesaid concerns that contributed to the decisions in
Patterson and Bates, the Los Angeles ordinance “[was] subject to the same infirmity”).
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Thirty-five years after Talley, the Supreme Court again held an
identification provision unconstitutional as applied to an individual
pamphleteer. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission94 involved an Ohio
statute that prohibited the circulation of anonymous campaign literature.95
The plaintiff’s decedent had distributed leaflets urging parents to vote
against a proposed school tax levy without including her name on many of
the documents, and incurred a fee for doing so.96 The Court, echoing its
sentiment in Talley, explained that a pamphleteer’s decision to publish
anonymously may stem from fear of retaliation or chastisement, or “a
desire to preserve as much of [his or her] privacy as possible.”97 The Court
also noted that anonymity may ensure that an audience does not prejudge
or disregard an author’s message out of dislike for the author.98 As in
Talley, the Court did not opine as to whether a risk of physical or
reputational harm had caused the decedent to distribute her leaflets
anonymously. It instead observed that an author’s choice to remain
anonymous is a constitutionally-protected aspect of freedom of speech.99
The Court recognized that Ohio’s interest in exposing fraudulent conduct
and its sources had special significance.100 Nevertheless, the Court found
that this did not justify what it saw as a broad prohibition on the use of
anonymous speech.101
3. Mistaken Presumptions About Constituent Decision-Making
A final reason for not using grassroots lobbying laws to combat
Astroturfing focuses on constituent audiences. Opponents of legislation
assert that grassroots lobbying bills falsely assume that citizens are naïve
and impressionable, and that the government must strive to weed out
Astroturfers to prevent constituents from making ill-informed choices that
do not promote the general welfare.102 As opponents observe, citizens do
not need the presence of grassroots efforts in order to make educated
choices as to where they stand on political matters; they have the levelheadedness to form independent judgments, judgments based on personal
94

514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337–38.
97
Id. at 341–42.
98
Id. at 342.
99
Id.
100
See id. at 349 (“We agree with Ohio’s submission that this interest [in preventing fraud] carries
special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse
consequences for the public at large.”).
101
See id. at 357 (“Ohio has not shown that its interest in preventing the misuse of anonymous
election-related speech justifies a prohibition of all uses of that speech.”).
102
See Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 175 (“Grassroots lobbying bills are based upon
the paternalistic notion that the government needs to regulate grassroots organizations because citizens
are naïve, gullible, and incapable of making well-informed decisions about public policy on their
own.”).
95
96
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beliefs of the importance of these issues.
The McIntyre decision supported the notion that citizens do not need
disclosure laws to effectively evaluate the messages of political advocates.
The Court maintained that the identity of the author of a handbill or flier is
“no different” from other features of the document’s content that the author
may include or exclude at will.104 Because the recipients of handbills and
fliers may have no prior acquaintance with the person who distributed
them, the Court reasoned that disclosure laws such as those which Ohio
enacted would not improve the reader’s ability to judge the author’s
message.105 Furthermore, disclosure might, as the Court suggested (and as
noted previously), dissuade the author from exercising his or her First
Amendment right of political expression out of fear for his or her personal
wellbeing. Similarly, in a New York State case involving an allegedly
overbroad election-related speech law, a New York trial court warned that
to require political activists to disclose their identities is to underestimate
the ability of average citizens to assess the sources of anonymous speech
and the ideas the speech conveys.106
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S COMPELLING INTEREST IN IDENTIFYING AND
CONTROLLING ASTROTURF LOBBYING
Despite First Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court and other
courts have maintained that the government has a compelling interest in
addressing fake grassroots lobbying through registration, reporting, and
disclosure requirements. Even courts that have ruled against certain
legislative efforts to address Astroturfing have not disagreed with this
presupposition. Part A discusses United States v. Harriss,107 a Supreme
Court case upholding a federal lobbying disclosure law which the Court
construed to apply to artificial grassroots advocacy. Part B discusses
subsequent case law at the state and federal level, showing that the
governmental interest in exposing and controlling sham grassroots
advocacy withstands the arguments of critics that legislative efforts to
address Astroturfing are overbroad, silence grassroots advocates, and
violate the anonymity principle. Part B also shows that these arguments
are inaccurate or exaggerated. Lastly, Part C provides insight into
103

ACLU, ACLU Letter to the Senate Opposing Expansions of Post-Employment Bans and
Regulations on Grassroots Lobbying (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/print/free-speech/aclu-lettersenate-opposing-expansions-post-employment-bans-and- regulations-grassroots-l.
104
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348.
105
Id. at 348–49.
106
See New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (“People are intelligent
enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. . . . They can evaluate its anonymity along
with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message.”), aff’d, 354
N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1974).
107
347 U.S. 612 (1954).
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campaign-finance reporting and disclosure requirements to illustrate that,
just as these rules foster open and vibrant political discourse with respect to
election-based speech, so too would similar standards in the area of
grassroots lobbying.
A. United States v. Harriss: Early Approval of Grassroots Lobbying
Legislation
In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
(FRLA).108 The Act stated that persons compensated “to influence the
passage or defeat of any [federal] legislation” were to register with the
government and to disclose certain information, including who employed
them, the amount of compensation they received, and the nature of their
expenses.109 The Act further stipulated that failure to abide by these
requirements could result in a penalty of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for
upwards of one year, as well as a three-year ban on attempts to influence,
“directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any proposed
legislation.”110
Eight years later, in United States v. Harriss, the Government charged
a corporate lobbying body with failure to report the solicitation and receipt
of contributions to influence the passage of legislation that would increase
the price of certain agricultural goods and to defeat legislation that would
cause a decrease in those prices.111 It also charged several individual
lobbyists with failure to report expenditures directed at the
accomplishment of these goals and failure to register with Congress.112
These persons reportedly “were hired to express certain views to Congress
as to agricultural prices or to cause others to do so,” and “arranged to have
members of Congress contacted on behalf of these views” directly or via
“an artificially stimulated letter campaign.”113 The defendants claimed that
FRLA was unlawfully vague and that it violated their First Amendment
rights of free speech, the press, and petition.114
On the topic of vagueness, the Court narrowed the possible
construction of FRLA in order to avoid doubts as to the Act’s validity.115
The Government had argued that, under FRLA, all persons who incurred
expenses for the purposes of influencing legislation were to report these
expenses, regardless of whether they solicited or received contributions for
108

Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 839 (1946) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 261–70 (1994)) (repealed in

1995).

109

Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. § 267(a) (1952).
Id. § 269(a)–(b).
111
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 614–15.
112
Id. at 615–17.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 617.
115
Id. at 620–21, 623.
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116

doing so.
The Court, however, disagreed, finding that the language of
the provisions made clear that those required to file expense reports were
strictly persons paid to encourage the passage or defeat of federal
legislation.117 Nevertheless, the Court suggested that Congress could pass
separate legislation covering persons who did not receive compensation for
their advocacy activities.118
The Court also observed that FRLA required expenditure reports and
disclosures where the method of influencing the passage or defeat of
legislation was through “direct communication” with or “direct pressure[]”
on members of Congress.119 In listing conduct and activities which
constituted “direct pressure,” the Court mentioned as one such example
what it termed an “artificially stimulated letter campaign.”120 While the
Court did not clarify what this phrase meant, the context in which it used
the phrase and the Court’s discussion as to whether FRLA violated the
defendants’ First Amendment liberties suggested that the phrase referred to
Astroturf lobbying and that the prime objective of FRLA was to identify
this conduct.
In a footnote, the Court cited the legislative history of FRLA to show
that direct pressure on members of Congress, to which FRLA applied,
included an artificially stimulated letter campaign. According to the text,
persons and entities who “initiate[d] propaganda from all over the country
in the form of letters and telegrams” were to disclose the sources of their
“collections,” or information, and the methods by which they disbursed
collections.121 This was because many such letters, telegrams, and related
items were, or had the potential to be, “based entirely upon misinformation
as to facts.”122 The Court also found that, based on the manner in which it
interpreted FRLA, the Act did not violate the defendants’ freedoms of
speech, the press, and petition.123 The Court then concluded that the
ultimate aim of the Act was to identify lobbyists and front groups that
posed as everyday public advocates:
[L]egislative complexities are such that . . . members of
Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures
to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of
the American ideal of government by elected representatives
116

Id. at 619–20.
Id. at 623.
118
See id. at 619–20 (suggesting that Congress could introduce “further legislation” applying
FRLA’s reporting requirements to persons who did not solicit or receive compensation for their
lobbying activities).
119
Id. at 620, 623–24.
120
Id. at 620.
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Id. at 620–21 & n.10 (quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
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Id. at 625.
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depends . . . on their ability to properly evaluate such
pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too
easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups
seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents
of the public weal. This is the evil which the Lobbying Act
was designed to help prevent.124
Activity of the kind highlighted in FRLA’s legislative history
correlates with some characteristics of Astroturfing, including the sending
of letters to elected leaders and the tendency of Astroturf lobbyists to
misrepresent what their campaigns seek to achieve.125 Moreover, given
that Astroturfing involves creating the impression that citizens have spoken
out about specific government action, the Court’s phrasing evinces a belief
that a primary goal of FRLA was to expose artificial grassroots activity
and, through exposure, control it. Further, the Court appeared to classify
the prevention of special interests from “masquerading” as public interest
proponents as a “vital national interest,” one that Congress could lawfully
pursue through legislation like FRLA.126
B. Subsequent Case Law: Furthering the Harriss Precedent
1. Judicial Disagreement with the Alleged Reach and Possible
Chilling Effect of Grassroots Lobbying Legislation
Perhaps the greatest concern of opponents of legislative efforts to
address Astroturf lobbying, as discussed earlier, is the conviction that such
laws will extend to genuine grassroots advocacy and effectively silence
real activists. On the one hand, this is a legitimate concern, especially with
respect to parties who express controversial views or who advocate in
volatile locations, and for whom exemption from disclosure may be
necessary. On the other hand, opponents have either exaggerated the
alleged reach of grassroots lobbying legislation and its capacity to chill the
political expression of grassroots activists, or have made inaccurate claims
about these issues.127
Regarding statutory overbreadth in the area of the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court has declared statutes unconstitutionally overbroad
“sparingly and only as a last resort.”128 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the
Court observed that it has sustained claims of facial overbreadth where
124

Id. (emphasis added).
See MASKELL, supra note 45, at 11 (observing that artificially stimulated letter campaigns “are
now often called ‘astroturf’ lobbying”).
126
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625–26; see also MASKELL, supra note 45, at 5 (suggesting that the
Government’s asserted interest in protecting government processes from practices like Astroturfing
“has been long recognized as a significant, important and compelling governmental interest”).
127
See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.
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Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
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statutes seek to regulate pure speech and “the time, place, and manner of
expressive or communicative conduct.”129 At the same time, however, the
Court explained that overbreadth scrutiny is less rigid with respect to
statutes which, in regulating specific conduct (and not merely speech),
exert an incidental effect on First Amendment rights “in a neutral,
noncensorial manner.”130 As to whether legislation which risks silencing
grassroots activists represents an impermissible abridgment of their First
Amendment liberties, opponents have not fully recognized that a possible
deterrent effect may not be enough for a court to deem this kind of
legislation unconstitutional. Indeed, Harriss suggests that legislation like
FRLA may stand even where the potential exists for activists to feel
discouraged from engaging in advocacy.131
In the wake of Harriss, federal and state courts have upheld
registration, reporting, and disclosure laws against challenges regarding
alleged statutory overbreadth and chilling effects. One such case,
Commission on Independent Colleges & Universities v. New York
Temporary State Commission on Regulation of Lobbying,132 involved a
challenge to the New York Regulation of Lobbying Act. The Act required
registration of and reporting of expenditures above $1,000 from anyone
employed for the purpose of conducting “‘lobbying activities.’”133
Lobbying activities were defined as “‘attempts to influence the passage or
defeat of legislation by . . . the legislature, approval or disapproval of any
legislation by the Governor, or the adoption or rejection of any rule or
regulation having the force and effect of law.’”134 The statute also
included both civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.135 The
plaintiffs contested the statute, arguing vagueness and that it was an
overbroad restriction of their First Amendment freedoms of speech,
petition, and association.136
Concerning vagueness, the court found no evidence that the statute
required disclosure of indirect lobbying activities that went beyond the
direct pressures the Supreme Court mentioned in Harriss, observing that
the New York State Legislature could lawfully tailor a disclosure law to
cover indirect grassroots lobbying.137 As to the asserted chilling effect of
129

Id. at 612–13.
Id. at 614.
131
See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626 (“The hazard of [First Amendment] restraint is too remote to
require striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of congressional
power and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest.”).
132
534 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
133
Id. at 491.
134
Id. at 491–92 (quoting N.Y. LEG. LAW §§ 3(a)–(b), 8(a)(1) (1982) (repealed 1987)).
135
Id. at 492.
136
Id.
137
See id. at 496–97 (citing Harriss, 347 U.S. at 621 n.10) (observing that “[Harriss] held that
indirect lobbying, in the form of campaigns to exhort the public to send letters and telegrams to
government officials, could be included within the definition of lobbying activities”).
130
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the statute, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the law
deprived them of the ability to discuss the merits of proposed government
action. As the Harriss Court emphasized, the deterrent effect of a statute
like FRLA emanates more from self-censorship by the party that abstains
from advocacy than it does from the statute itself.138 Legislation critics
charge that deterrence is directly attributable to the statute.139 In
Commission on Independent Colleges, the court suggested that no chilling
effect existed with regard to the plaintiffs, or that the plaintiffs, through
self-censorship, had inflated the effect, if it did, in fact, exist.140 As the
court noted, the plaintiffs offered no record of economic reprisals, loss of
employment or other manifestations of hostility,141 conduct which
influenced the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson142
and Bates v. City of Little Rock143 to void similar disclosure laws. The
court held that New York’s interest in disclosure was compelling enough
to outweigh the alleged deterrent effect of the statute.144
Another case, Minnesota State Ethical Practices Board v. National
Rifle Ass’n of America,145 centered on an NRA allegation that the
Minnesota Ethics in Government Act violated NRA members’ freedom of
association.146 The Act required lobbyists to register and to regularly
report their lobbying activities, defining “lobbyist[s]” as individuals who
received compensation and who spent more than a certain amount of time
and money “for the purpose of attempting to influence legislative or
administrative action by communicating or urging others to communicate
with public officials.”147 The executive director for the NRA’s lobbying
division had, in one year, sent several letters and a mailgram to the
organization’s 54,000 members in Minnesota, encouraging them to contact
their state legislators in support of pending legislation.148 In another year,
the director mailed a letter, bumper sticker, and brochure to those same
members, urging the defeat of a particular candidate in an upcoming
election.149
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that, in light of Harriss,
138
See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626 (noting that, even if FRLA had a deterrent effect, “the restraint
[was] at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship”).
139
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
140
See Comm’n on Indep. Colls. & Univs., 534 F. Supp. at 498 (“The Court believes that the
plaintiffs [sic] arguments . . . fall largely into the category of self-censorship as outlined in Harriss v.
United States.”).
141
Id. at 498–99 (citations omitted).
142
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
143
361 U.S. 516 (1960).
144
Comm’n on Indep. Colls. & Univs., 534 F. Supp. at 499.
145
761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
146
Id. at 510.
147
Id. at 510–11 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 10A.01–11(a), 10A.03–.04 (1984)).
148
Id. at 511.
149
Id.
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identifying parties behind artificially stimulated letter campaigns was a
compelling governmental interest justifying the Act’s registration
provisions.150 The court also suggested that the actions of the NRA’s
executive director amounted to an artificially stimulated letter campaign,
even if they only involved contact between members within an
organization instead of contact between separate entities.151 As to
disclosure, the court made no finding that the statute was so broad as to
impermissibly infringe on the plaintiffs’ ability to freely associate. While
the plaintiffs may have experienced some infringement, the court noted
that they failed to apply for an exemption from the Act, which would take
effect if the applicant could show that disclosure would expose it to
reprisals, loss of employment, or threats of physical harm.152
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Florida League of Professional
Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs153 rejected claims that Florida’s lobbying
disclosure act was overbroad and thus invalid. The contested sections
required that lobbyists report indirect lobbying activities, including
“‘media advertising [campaigns]’” and associated expenses.154 The
plaintiff suggested that, to the extent the law required reporting of indirect
expenses when there was no direct contact with elected officials, it was not
narrowly tailored to meet Florida’s interest in “‘maintain[ing] the integrity
of a basic governmental process.’”155 The court, rejecting this assertion,
found that not only was Florida’s interest compelling, but that, in light of
the rulings in Harriss and Minnesota State Ethical Practices Board, the
First Amendment allowed compelled reporting of “considerably more than
face-to-face contact with government officials.”156 The court added that a
legislative interest in disclosure may be stronger with respect to indirect
pressure on officials because of the possible difficulty involved in
evaluating such pressure.157

150
See id. at 512 (noting that the Harriss Court concluded that “the Lobbying Act applied to the
form of lobbying used in this case, namely, communication with lawmakers through an artificially
stimulated letter campaign,” and finding that, as a result, Minnesota had “a compelling interest in
requiring lobbyists to register their activities”).
151
See id. at 513 (“When persons engage in an extensive letterwriting campaign for the purpose
of influencing specific legislation, the State’s interest is the same whether or not those persons are
members of an association.”); see also William V. Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying
Disclosure: A Recipe for Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 32, 45 (2006) (finding that current case law does not
militate in favor of exemption from grassroots lobbying disclosure laws where contacts for action are
interorganizational).
152
Minn. State Ethical Practices Bd., 761 F.2d at 512 (citing MINN. STAT. § 10A.20-8 (1984)).
153
87 F.3d 457 (11th Cir. 1996).
154
Id. at 458–60 (citing FLA. STAT. § 11.045(3)(a) (1996)).
155
Id. at 460 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)).
156
Id. at 461.
157
See id. (“[T]he government interest in providing the means to evaluate . . . pressures [on
officials] may in some ways be stronger when the pressures are indirect, because then they are harder to
identify without the aid of disclosure requirements.”).
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The Vermont Supreme Court in Kimbell v. Hooper likewise upheld
challenged provisions of Vermont’s lobbying disclosure law, which
required persons who received compensation above a certain amount for
purposes of influencing legislators to report their indirect contacts to
influence legislative or administrative action.159 The court noted that
statutes such as Vermont’s are not subject to the same strict scrutiny as
laws which burden pure speech, because lobbying activities entail conduct
in addition to speech.160 Moreover, the court reasoned that the statute
furthered the vital governmental interest of preventing paid lobbyists from
posing as advocates of the public welfare.161 Accordingly, the court
neither regarded the statute as overbroad nor found reason to declare the
law unconstitutional because of the mere possibility that it could have a
chilling effect on activists.162
The above cases show that, based on the findings of numerous courts,
grassroots lobbying statutes do not present a uniform risk of silencing
grassroots advocates, and that an alleged risk to certain parties does not
justify a complete prohibition on the use of such laws to address fake
grassroots advocacy. Opponents are right that Patterson and Bates stand
for the notion that laws which will substantially curtail the ability of
specific grassroots advocates to express themselves politically cannot
stand. But the cases discussed above show that plaintiffs who seek to
overturn such laws must provide evidence that disclosure would expose
them to hostility, and not speculate as to the threat.163 Talley v.
California164 and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission165 may not have
required factual demonstrations, but, as the next subsection argues, there
seems to be another reason why the Supreme Court ruled as it did in those
cases. Montana Automobile Ass’n v. Greely166 likewise may be an
exception to the rule, as a state court case, but it appears to be alone in this
regard,167 and the court in Greely still perceived a compelling
governmental interest in disclosure for purposes of identifying Astroturf

158

665 A.2d 44 (Vt. 1995).
Id. at 46 & n.1 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 §§ 261(5), (9)–(10) (1993)).
See id. at 47 (suggesting that, in regard to lobbying, “‘conduct and not merely speech [are]
involved,’” signifying that alleged statutory overbreadth “‘must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,’” before a court may find the statute
unconstitutionally overbroad (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))).
161
Id. at 48.
162
Id. at 48–49 (citations omitted).
163
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 69–70 (1976), similarly supports this point.
164
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
165
514 U.S. 334 (1995).
166
632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981).
167
See MASKELL, supra note 45, at 15 & n.59 (citing Greely but mentioning no other state court
decision holding that disclosure of “‘indirect’” grassroots lobbying goes beyond the allowable bounds
of governmental regulation).
159
160
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lobbying.
Finally, the statutes at issue in Patterson and Bates
(particularly the former) did not concern revealing and deterring
Astroturfing so much as enabling the respective jurisdictions to learn more
about certain organizations with which they were at odds.169
2. Clarification of the Scope of the Right To Speak and Publish
Anonymously
While Talley and McIntyre suggest that an activist’s interest in
anonymity trumps the mandates of grassroots lobbying disclosure laws
even where the risk of a chilling effect on advocacy efforts is speculative,
it is not apparent that the activity in those cases constitutes issue advocacy
in its commonly-understood sense. The main conception of issue
advocacy, touched upon in Part I, is that it encompasses efforts of ordinary
constituents to communicate their viewpoints to elected officials, usually
their representatives, and to convince other citizens to follow suit.170
Although Talley and McIntyre involved the expression of particular
viewpoints, it does not appear that the speakers in those cases directed their
statements toward elected representatives or that they attempted to
persuade fellow constituents to share similar outlooks with officials. The
plaintiff in Talley had espoused a belief in equal-opportunity hiring
practices and encouraged others to not buy from certain retailers,171 while
the speaker in McIntyre had criticized a prospective school tax and
requested that residents vote against it.172 Activity of this kind—perhaps
best described as “‘speech on the street”’ or “anonymous speech in the
public sphere”173—seems to garner greater protection of the asserted right
to speak and publish anonymously than does the petitioning of
governmental bodies,174 under which grassroots lobbying would appear to
168
The Greely court inferred from the purpose of the ballot initiative “a compelling need for
disclosure,” even if some components of the measure were unlawful. Greely, 632 P.2d at 302–03.
169
Professor Luneburg observes that, with respect to the law in question in Patterson, “[w]hatever
lobbying the NAACP may have undertaken in Alabama, that was clearly not the main concern of the
state.” Luneburg, supra note 88, at 80. Instead, “the activity of the organization in trying to assist the
admission of blacks to state universities and in supporting a boycott by blacks of a bus line in
Montgomery allegedly violated [the requirement that] foreign corporations . . . ‘qualify’ before doing
business in Alabama.” Id.
170
See, e.g., Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 173–74 (“Grassroots [advocacy] is simply
the efforts of average Americans to share their viewpoints with their elected representatives and [to]
encourage other Americans to do the same.”).
171
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 61 (1960).
172
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 & n.2 (1995).
173
Luneburg, supra note 88, at 82, 85.
174
Professor Luneburg makes the following distinction:
[The] public tradition for petitioning governmental bodies should be contrasted with
the long and contemporaneous practice of anonymous speech in the public sphere
relied upon in cases like Talley and McIntyre. . . . [In] fashioning the contours of
freedom of speech in the public sphere the Supreme Court has appropriately
considered the need for anonymity to improve the quality and quantity of public
debate, [but] history decidedly does not [suggest] that anonymity should attach to

2010]

ARTIFICIAL GRASSROOTS ADVOCACY

383

primarily fall. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in McIntyre recognized
limitations to its decision, suggesting that, in “larger circumstances,” there
may be a more substantial interest in identity disclosure.175
Even assuming that the right to speak and publish anonymously
applies to grassroots lobbyists, critics exaggerate the scope of coverage this
right affords. The principle of anonymity may, for instance, permit
advocacy groups to refrain from divulging member identities where a
genuine risk of hostility exists. But courts have found that disclosure of
other information, such as the identities of contributors and the financial
support they supply to advocacy groups, which may indirectly illuminate
the identities of parties that belong to these groups, is acceptable.176
The Supreme Court of Washington in Young Americans for Freedom,
Inc. v. Gorton177 upheld a detailed lobbying disclosure statute against a
claim that the law required disclosure of the respondent organization’s
entire membership list and the identities of contributors to a specific
campaign, and thereby violated the organization’s First Amendment rights
of association and privacy.178 The controversial provision required
reporting of “grass roots campaign activity” designed, directly or
indirectly, to influence legislation, and if campaign expenses exceeded a
specified threshold, the party sponsoring the campaign had to additionally
report contributions and the names and addresses of contributors.179 The
court narrowly construed the act so that groups engaged in grassroots
campaigns would not need to reveal their membership lists, yet observed
that the statute could still require the disclosure of contributors without
unduly impinging on the association and privacy rights of these groups.180
It also refused to strike down the section of the statute mandating
disclosure of indirect lobbying activities, finding that doing so “would
leave a loophole for indirect lobbying” and render the public uninformed
as to the sponsorship of activities such as “‘artificially stimulated letter
campaign[s].’”181 This concern, according to the court, was “paramount”
to the respondent’s interest in avoiding the inconvenience of reporting its
petitions for governmental action.
Id. at 85. In addition, the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985), found that
the right of petition merits no more defense than that afforded freedom of speech (or, for that matter,
other First Amendment liberties), because the former is in essence “cut from the same cloth” as the
latter.
175
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). More on this point appears in Part
IV.A.3 infra.
176
See infra notes 177–90 and accompanying text.
177
522 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1974) (en banc).
178
Id. at 191. The right of privacy to which the respondent alluded and which the court
mentioned seems to refer to “privacy in one’s associations.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
179
Gorton, 522 P.2d at 191.
180
Id. at 191–92.
181
Id. at 192 (italics omitted) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954)).
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indirect advocacy activities.
More recently, the court in ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen183 upheld
provisions of California’s Political Reform Act (PRA) against similar
attacks.184 These sections required that ballot committees disclose the
names and other personal information of parties who contributed at least
one hundred dollars, which the plaintiff committees attacked as not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and thus violative of
the First Amendment.185 The court conceded that these provisions affected
the ability of the committees to privately associate.186 Nonetheless, it
found that California had a compelling interest in unmasking phony
grassroots advocacy by providing citizens with details about contributors
and expenditures targeted at the passage or defeat of ballot initiatives.187
The court also found no evidence that any of the plaintiffs’ contributors
would cease providing support to the plaintiffs if faced with identity
disclosure.188 Moreover, the threats and harassment the plaintiffs claimed
would befall them if forced to divulge information regarding their
contributors were not, as the court reasoned, so great as to justify affording
the plaintiffs the benefit of anonymity.189 Lastly, the court found that the
PRA’s one hundred-dollar disclosure threshold was not overly burdensome
to the plaintiffs, noting that it did not restrict how much contributors could
give to committees or how much committees could spend on advocacy.190
C. Election-Based Speech Laws, the Marketplace of Ideas, and Its
Application to Grassroots Lobbying
The Supreme Court has offered greater direct insight into the validity
of election-related speech disclosure laws than it has similar laws regarding
grassroots lobbying. Yet the Court’s findings in the area of election-based
speech—in particular, that disclosure is generally constitutional—have
relevance to legislative efforts to address Astroturfing, suggesting that
disclosure of artificial grassroots advocacy would support the free flow of
182

Id.
599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
184
Id. at 1204, 1223–24, 1226.
185
Id. at 1199, 1204.
186
See id. at 1205–06 (noting that the ability to freely associate enhances the efficacy of advocacy
efforts, and that compelled disclosure of contributors to committees such as the plaintiffs “indisputably
impinges on those vital freedoms of belief and assembly”).
187
See id. at 1209 (“‘[D]isclosure . . . prevents the wolf from masquerading in sheep’s clothing.’”
(quoting Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1106 n.24 (9th Cir. 2003))); see also id.
at 1211 (“[T]he Government’s interest is not only compelling, but critical to the proper functioning of
the State’s system of direct democracy.”).
188
See id. at 1215 (“Finally, there is no evidence that any of Plaintiffs’ contributors intend to
retreat from the marketplace of ideas such that available discourse will be materially diminished.”).
189
Id. at 1216–17, 1219–20.
190
Id. at 1221–24. Moreover, fewer than ten states had higher threshold requirements for
disclosure at the time. Id. at 1221–22 & n.10.
183
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ideas in political discourse. Moreover, these findings weaken the notion
that grassroots lobbying laws treat citizens as incapable of informed and
independent decision-making, showing that such laws instead provide
constituents with access to information that may otherwise be inaccessible
and which may be of interest to them.
1. Buckley v. Valeo and the Federal Election Campaign Act
In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 (FECA).191 The new statutory scheme provided that political action
committees, candidates running for election to federal offices and donors
who spent or gave more than one hundred dollars in a calendar year were
to file statements of receipts and expenses.192 The provisions required
disclosure of substantial information, including the names, mailing
addresses, occupations, and principal places of business of campaign
contributors.193 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court found the
mandates constitutional. The Court noted that forced disclosure could lead
to substantial encroachments on First Amendment rights, and so, as
discussed earlier, subjected the provisions to exacting scrutiny analysis.194
Yet it found that the governmental interests Congress sought to advance
through the FECA amendments were “sufficiently important to outweigh
the possibility of [First Amendment] infringement.”195 In construing the
disclosure amendments as applying only to groups who contributed funds
to “expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate,” and not to groups whose contributions were simply part of
“issue discussion,” the court upheld the provisions, finding that they not
only operated to deter corruption or its appearance, but illuminated
campaign-related expenditures that would otherwise go unreported.196
The Buckley Court also suggested that the disclosure provisions were
consistent with the concept of the marketplace of ideas. Under this
concept, freedom of expression must have minimal restraints in order to
promote robust exchange and discussion. The more points-of-view
circulating among citizens, the better able citizens are to ascertain ideas or
191

Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (1976)).
2 U.S.C. § 434(a), (e).
193
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63 (1976) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)).
194
Id. at 64, 66.
195
Id. at 66. The Court noted three categories of interests that Congress sought to vindicate:
First, disclosure provides the electorate with information [about sources and uses of
campaign money] in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal
office. . . . Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the
light of publicity. . . . Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and
disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to
detect violations of the contribution limitations described above.
Id. at 66–68.
196
Id. at 79–82.
192
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policies with which they agree (or disagree) most.
In the Buckley
Court’s opinion, the disclosure provisions did not muzzle the ability of
donors to espouse their views in the form of monetary contributions.
Instead, the provisions were a “minimally restrictive” means of promoting
First Amendment values “by opening the basic processes of [the country’s]
federal election system to public view.”198 The Court seemed to find that,
rather than treating citizens as naïve or incapable of informed evaluation of
speech, the provisions sought to make available information of political
importance,199 with no indication that disclosure would reduce the
vivaciousness of political discourse.
2. McConnell v. FEC, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., Citizens
United v. FEC, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
Following Buckley, other courts have agreed that election-based speech
disclosure provisions promote open and active discourse.200 The Supreme
Court expanded on Buckley in 2003 in deciding McConnell v. FEC.201 The
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)202 amended FECA to
mandate the disclosure of “electioneering communications.” It defined this
activity as broadcast, cable, or satellite communications that clearly
identified candidates for federal office, and which ran either sixty days
before a general election for the office sought or thirty days before a
primary election for the same office.203 Congress had promulgated the
revisions in part because it had observed that, post-Buckley, parties could
circumvent FECA’s demands for disclosure of express advocacy
contributions by asking donors to give money to interest groups that ran
supportive issue advertisements.204 The McConnell Court found BCRA’s
definition of “electioneering communications” acceptable, even as applied
197
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[Citizens]
may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . .”).
198
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82.
199
See id. at 81 (suggesting that disclosure of expenditures that would otherwise go unreported
would help voters better define the “constituencies” of political candidates).
200
See, e.g., FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The vision of a free and open
marketplace of ideas is based on the assumption that the people should be exposed to speech on all
sides, so that they may freely evaluate and choose from among competing points of view.”). The court
found that the First Amendment aims to ensure that citizens have available to them all the information
necessary to evaluate speech. Id. Thus the court observed that disclosure requirements “are
indispensable to the proper and effective exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id.
201
540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
202
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified
primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
203
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
204
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129 (“[P]olitical parties and candidates used the availability of socalled issue ads to circumvent FECA’s limitations, asking donors who contributed their permitted quota
of hard money to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on ‘issue’ advocacy.” (citing
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 518–19 (D.D.C. 2003))).
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to issue advocacy, noting that the express advocacy limitation in Buckley
stemmed from statutory interpretation, not constitutional orders.205 The
Court also rejected the notion that the First Amendment “erects a rigid
barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy,” for while
electioneering communications may not explicitly urge their audience to
vote for or against a candidate, they still intend to influence the election.206
In addition to the above requirements, BCRA stipulated that persons
disbursing more than $10,000 in a calendar year for the direct costs of
producing and airing electioneering communications were to disclose the
identities or principal places of business of all parties sharing the costs of
the expenditures and the elections to which the communications
pertained.207 The Court determined that Congress had important interests
in mind when it enacted BCRA, namely, providing the electorate with
information and deterring actual or apparent corruption in election-related
speech.208 The Court thus appeared to agree that the BCRA disclosure
requirements—like the FECA provisions before them—fostered
transparent discussion and provided essential details for constituents
seeking to make informed political decisions.209 This was especially true
because the provisions barred no party from speaking and required no
party to reveal the specific contents of electioneering communications.210
Consequently, the Court found BCRA’s disclosure requirements
constitutional.211
The Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life, Inc.212 and Citizens United v. FEC213 have invalidated sections of
BCRA, but have not disturbed McConnell as it concerns disclosure. Prior
to Wisconsin Right to Life, BCRA criminalized all organizational
sponsorship of electioneering communications.214 In asserting that the
Constitution does not compel a distinction between issue advocacy and
express advocacy, the Court in McConnell found the penalty lawful as

205

Id. at 190–94.
Id. at 193.
207
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1), (2)(A)–(B), (D) (2006). The McConnell Court referred to these
provisions as components of “amended FECA § [304].” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194.
208
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196.
209
See id. at 196–97 (restating the District Court’s opinion that the plaintiffs failed to show how
vibrant speech can occur when entities can shield themselves from disclosure, and that the plaintiffs’
argument for invalidating BCRA’s disclosure orders failed to reinforce the First Amendment values the
plaintiffs argued BCRA burdened, yet ignored the competing First Amendment interests of citizens
seeking to make informed political decisions).
210
Id. at 201 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 241 (D.D.C. 2003)).
211
Id. at 201–02.
212
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
213
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
214
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 §§ 203(a), 214(d), 312(a), 2 U.S.C. §§
437g(d)(1)(A), 441b(a), (b)(2) (2006).
206
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applied to issue advocacy.
Yet it also noted that the interests that
justified the regulation of express advocacy (or “campaign speech”)—such
as those emphasized in Buckley—might not apply to the regulation of issue
advocacy (or “genuine issue ads”).216
The Court in Wisconsin Right to Life used this observation to find that
the plaintiff’s advertisements were not functionally equivalent to express
The advertisements encouraged viewers to contact
advocacy.217
Wisconsin’s Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial
nominees, and the plaintiff intended to continue broadcasting them
throughout the month of the state’s 2004 primary.218 The Court determined
that the advertisements would be functionally equivalent to express
advocacy, and thus regulable only if “susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.”219 In applying this analysis, the Court concluded that the
advertisements were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy; the
Court observed that the advertisements displayed the hallmarks of a
“genuine issue ad”—in that they focused and took a position on a
legislative issue, exhorted the public to do the same, and urged constituent
contacts with elected officials—and that they failed to mention a particular
election or candidate or take a stance on a candidate’s character or
qualifications.220 The Court hence found BCRA’s criminalization of
electioneering communications, in the context of issue advocacy,
unconstitutional.221
In Citizens United, the plaintiff sought to run television commercials
promoting a documentary it had produced about then-Senator Hillary
Clinton and to make the film available through video-on-demand.222 At the
time, Senator Clinton was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008
Presidential primary elections, and the film mentioned her by name and
contained commentary critical of her.223 The plaintiff planned to pay for
the commercials, which would run within thirty days of the primaries, but
BCRA prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to
215
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204–05, 209. More recently, though, a Colorado court found that a
similar state law only covered communications that contained “‘magic words’” expressly advocating
the election or defeat of candidates—such as “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ . . . ‘vote against,’ [and] ‘defeat.’”
Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, Nos. 08CA2689 & 09CA0384, 2010 Colo. App.
LEXIS 368, at *1, *6–7, *24, *32–33 (Colo. App. Mar. 18, 2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 44 n.52 (1976)).
216
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206–07 n.88.
217
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 478–79.
218
Id. at 458–60.
219
Id. at 469–70.
220
Id. at 470.
221
See id. at 481 (holding the aforesaid provision unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s
advertisements).
222
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
223
Id.
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independently finance electioneering communications expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for office.224
Observing that speakers from all areas of society use money to fund
their speech, and that the First Amendment protects this activity, the Court
found no support for the idea that the First Amendment “would permit the
suppression of [corporate] political speech.”225 The Court reasoned that
the purpose and effect of the expenditure prohibition was to prevent
corporate ideas from reaching the public.226 It further reasoned that the
potential for unrestricted spending to greatly influence elections would not
cause citizens “to lose faith in our democracy,” noting that the willingness
of corporations to spend money in an attempt to persuade voters
“presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected
officials.”227 Hence, in finding that the BCRA provision amounted to a
command as to where the electorate could get its information, the Court
held it unlawful.228
Despite these decisions, McConnell still stands as good law as it
pertains to disclosure under BCRA. Nowhere in Wisconsin Right to Life
did the Court take issue with BCRA’s disclosure demands, which raise
fewer First Amendment concerns than do outright prohibitions on certain
forms of advocacy.229 Had the Court sought to overturn McConnell’s
ruling that BCRA could mandate disclosure of issue-advocate-sponsored
electioneering communications, or had it sought to equate “regulation”
with disclosure, it could have explicitly done so. But while this lack of
explicit language in Wisconsin Right to Life about disclosure may suggest
only tacit accordance with McConnell, the Citizens United Court directly
agreed that disclosure furthers important governmental interests and fosters
informed political discussion.230
224
See id. at 887–88 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2) (2006)) (“Corporations and unions are barred from using their general treasury funds for
express advocacy or electioneering communications.”).
225
Id. at 905–06.
226
Id. at 907.
227
Id. at 910.
228
See id. at 908, 911 (comparing the effect of the provision to unconstitutional censorship and an
impermissible outright ban on corporate political speech during preelection periods).
229
See Luneburg, supra note 88, at 103 (noting that Wisconsin Right to Life may have signaled a
departure from the notion that disclosure of at least some grassroots advocacy is constitutional, but that
the case involved the criminalization of the activity in question instead of simply disclosure, which
does not risk burdening First Amendment rights to the same degree); see also Krishnakumar, supra
note 17, at 534 (“[D]isclosure . . . may be the only method of lobbying regulation permissible under the
First Amendment.”); Steven A. Browne, Note, The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating
Associational Privacy and the Right To Petition the Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717,
736–37 (1995) (“Mere registration and reporting requirements do not interfere substantially with any
First Amendment rights.”).
230
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–16 (observing that the electorate’s interest in knowing
the identities of those speaking about candidates justified BCRA’s disclosure provisions, and that
disclosure enables citizens to make informed political decisions and to properly evaluate different
speakers and messages).
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3. Application to Grassroots Lobbying Laws and the Control of
Astroturfing
The decisions in Buckley, McConnell, and Citizens United—and, to a
lesser extent, Wisconsin Right to Life—apply for several reasons to efforts
to address Astroturfing through grassroots lobbying legislation. First, the
cases show that speech in the framework of elections is a form of political
advocacy. The Supreme Court intimated that a campaign contribution or
an advertisement indirectly urging citizens to contact their representatives,
depending on its source, constitutes issue advocacy. Indeed, both involve
conveying certain views to elected officials or encouraging others to do the
same.
Given the finding in McConnell that BCRA’s disclosure
requirements could lawfully apply to electioneering communications of
both the express and the genuine-issue variety and promote an open
exchange of ideas, it would appear that disclosure laws directed at
grassroots lobbying outside the elections context are similarly
constitutional and—by ensuring citizen exposure to information—would
likewise promote the sort of active discourse that the First Amendment
seeks to cultivate.231 The above cases would also seem to suggest that
grassroots lobbying disclosure laws simply seek to make available
information that may be of political significance to curious citizens, but
that is not readily accessible in the absence of such requirements.
Additionally, just as statutes like FECA and BCRA strive to deter
corruption, or its appearance, in election-based speech, so too does
grassroots lobbying legislation aim to dissuade powerful individuals and
special interest groups from engaging in artificial grassroots advocacy.
The Court has on numerous occasions found that the government has a
sufficiently important interest in deterring real or apparent corruption in
election-based speech via disclosure laws,232 and McConnell extends the
reach of such laws to the electioneering communications of issue
advocates. Just as an electorate with knowledge of a candidate’s most
generous supporters could better discern special favors given in return for
231
See Luneburg & Susman, supra note 151, at 39 (arguing that “[m]andatory disclosure of
lobbying pressures” comports with the marketplace of ideas concept in that it ensures the availability of
relevant information to the public and to politicians for their consideration in developing public policy).
232
See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241, 243–44 (2006) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25, 55 (1976)) (noting the Buckley Court’s conclusion that the Government’s interest in
preventing corruption and its appearance provided ample justification for limits on campaign
contributions and finding no basis for overruling Buckley); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003)
(concluding that the governmental interest in deterring corruption, which justified FECA’s disclosure
requirements, likewise justified those of BCRA); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (arguing that disclosure
checks the improper use of money in politics by placing large contributions and expenditures in the
public light); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547–48 (1934) (stating that Congress retains
the power to protect presidential elections from corruption and declining to question Congress’s
determination that disclosure of political contributions, the names of contributors and other details
“would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections”).
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contributions, so too could informed citizens and government officials
better detect the presence of Astroturfing by those with deep pockets and
an issue to advance or defeat.
IV. DEVISING WORKABLE LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS
ASTROTURF LOBBYING
Congress has precedent upon which it may, and should, draw in
crafting legislation to expose and control Astroturfing. This Part considers
how to construct laws which will effectively address artificial grassroots
advocacy without significantly encroaching on the ability of ordinary
citizens to communicate with elected officials and fellow citizens about
possible government action. Part A examines some of the aspects of the
Senate’s most recent foray into grassroots lobbying legislation, in
conjunction with current lobbying laws, finding that, for the most part, the
proposed statute was a step in the right direction toward meaningful
lobbying reform.234 Part B considers other features that future grassroots
lobbying legislation could account for to strengthen the proposals.
A. The Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act: Proposed
Grassroots Lobbying Provisions in the Context of Current Lobbying
Laws
1. Distinction Between Grassroots Advocacy and Astroturf Lobbying
As explained in Part II, the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability
Act of 2007, parts of which became components of the Honest Leadership
and Open Government Act of 2007,235 initially contained a section
dedicated to the disclosure of Astroturfing.236 The section distinguished
“grassroots lobbying” from “paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying.”
“Grassroots lobbying” referred to voluntary efforts of members of the
public to convey their views on a given matter to federal officials or to
persuade other citizens to do the same.237 “Paid efforts to stimulate
grassroots lobbying,” on the other hand, referred to paid attempts on behalf
of a client to encourage the general public, or certain segments thereof, to
contact elected leaders and urge them to take a certain stance on a certain

233
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. The Buckley Court noted that “‘informed public opinion is the most
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.’” Id. at 67 n.79 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
234
Part A will only analyze the 2007 Senate proposal; the Shays-Meehan bill mostly contained
the same provisions as its Senate counterpart.
235
Pub. L. No. 110-81, §§ 201–15, 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735 (2007) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
236
S. 1, 110th Cong. § 220 (2007).
237
Id. § 220(a)(2).
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238

issue.
The definition of the former thus comported with the general
conception of activity that constitutes issue advocacy, while the definition
of the latter paralleled the Supreme Court’s notion of conduct representing
an artificially-stimulated letter campaign in United States v. Harriss.239
To ease potential concerns of citizen activists, the proposal specified
that lobbying activities, for purposes of the amended Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, would include “paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying”
but not “grassroots lobbying.”240 Moreover, to protect associations such as
nonprofits, the proposal stated that “paid efforts to stimulate grassroots
lobbying” would not include internal communications between an entity
Thus the Lobbying
and its members, employees, or officers.241
Transparency and Accountability Act made explicit that its registration,
reporting, and disclosure provisions were not to apply to the spontaneous
efforts of individual citizen advocates.
2. Thresholds for Disclosure
The Act also indicated that it was not to apply to grassroots advocacy
in a more indirect manner. Additional provisions took into consideration
the restricted size of many grassroots movements and the limited resources
upon which advocates may draw, and thus sought to protect advocates that
may fall within the “paid efforts” category. For example, one section
indicated that paid attempts to stimulate grassroots lobbying did not
include instances where lobbyists direct their efforts to encourage citizen
contacts of elected officials at fewer than 500 persons.242 Although this
provision would have risked exempting smaller cases of Astroturfing, it
nevertheless would have addressed larger and more influential campaigns.
The Act further specified that parties that engage in paid efforts to
stimulate grassroots lobbying would not need to register with the
government or report or disclose the activities toward which their
expenditures or income go unless spending or funding exceeds $25,000
quarterly.243 The $25,000 threshold would protect grassroots advocates,
since many, if not most, would lack the financial resources to exceed or
consistently exceed this amount. It would also identify the sponsors of
costly Astroturf campaigns that have succeeded in shaping public

238

Id.
347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954).
S. 1, § 220(a)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
241
Id. § 220(a)(2). But cf. Minn. State Ethical Practices Bd. v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 761 F.2d
509, 512–13 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (suggesting that the internal communications of an entity
directed at its members could fall within the ambit of an “artificially stimulated letter campaign” and
thus be subject to lobbying disclosure requirements).
242
S. 1, § 220(a)(2).
243
Id. § 220(a)(2), (b), (c)(1).
239
240
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opinion—though a lower threshold might suffice. Having four reporting
periods, which the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act
adopted,245 would ensure more frequent reporting and allow for closer
observations as to trends in the financing and expenses of supposed
grassroots-level campaigns. In addition, the Lobbying Transparency and
Accountability Act stated that the $25,000 threshold would apply
specifically to parties whom clients pay to engage in artificial issue
advocacy on their behalf, not parties who advocate on their own volition.246
3. Disclosure of Income, Expenses, and Identities
Under the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act, “lobbying
activities,” for purposes of determining whether a lobbyist would be
exempt from registration, would not include paid attempts to stimulate
grassroots lobbying.247 Considering the requirements of the Act alongside
the demands of active lobbying laws, lobbyists who engage in Astroturfing
would need to register in the event they receive more than $2,500 of
income or spend more than $10,000 in connection with direct lobbying
activities on behalf of a client.248 The registration would need to include
details such as the registrant’s name, address, contact information,
principal place of business, and a general description of his or her
activities, as well as similar information for the registrant’s clients.249 The
registrant would also need to include the name, address, and principal
place of business of any entity that contributes over $5,000 toward his or
her lobbying activities in a three-month period and that actively
participates in the planning, oversight, or control of these activities.250
Further, the registrant would need to file quarterly reports containing,
among other things, the registrant’s and client’s names,251 a list of specific
244

Professors Luneburg and Susman, writing in 2006, suggested that a threshold of between
$25,000 and $50,000 in income earned or amounts spent would account for the most substantial
Astroturfing. Luneburg & Susman, supra note 151, at 45. Since the federal lobbying laws in effect in
2006 required semiannual instead of quarterly reporting, Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 § 5(a), 2
U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006), their suggestion would imply (potentially) that paid lobbyists receiving or
spending more than $50,000 total in a calendar year could trigger disclosure. The Shays-Meehan
proposal, on the other hand, called for disclosure only where income or expenditures surpass $100,000
quarterly. H.R. 2093, 110th Cong. § 1(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2007). Such a threshold might be too generous, as
lobbyists orchestrating Astroturf activities could theoretically raise or spend $400,000 annually and still
evade disclosure under this scheme.
245
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 201(a)(1)(A),
2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735, 741 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a)).
246
S. 1, § 220(a)(2).
247
Id. § 220(b)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
248
§ 201(b)(5)(A)–(B), 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) at 742 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §
1603(a)(3)(A)).
249
2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1)–(2).
250
§ 207(a)(1)(A)–(B), 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) at 747 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§
1603(b)(3)(A)–(B)).
251
Id. § 201(a)(1)(A) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a)).
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issues and bills on which the registrant encouraged citizens to lobby,252 and
good faith estimates of income or expenses relating to paid efforts to
stimulate grassroots lobbying where such amounts surpass $25,000.253 The
contents of the registration and reports would thereafter be made publicly
available.254
Most individual citizens would probably not meet the disclosure
thresholds, and few, if any, would meet the aforementioned direct lobbying
income or expenditures floors. The provisions would thus apply primarily
to organizations and wealthy individuals, but the information sought would
appear to withstand constitutional muster. As McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission255 suggests, disclosure of financial information would not be
especially burdensome to registrants because it would not directly reveal
substantial information about their identities.256 Nor would it serve, as
McConnell v. FEC257 would suggest, as an outright prohibition on the
ability to lobby and advocate.258
This is not to say, however, that revelation of the identities of parties
amenable to the above provisions is unlawful. Granted, McIntyre suggests
that divulging the identity of a private citizen acting alone, where the
citizen’s activity is more or less pure speech, would ultimately provide
information that would be of little use in political discourse.259 Yet,
without going into much detail, the Court noted that “larger circumstances”
may require disclosure of the speaker’s identity.260 Applying this rationale
to the lobbying context, where a compelling interest exists as to the
exposure and control of Astroturfing, Congress appeared to have acted
within its powers in requiring disclosure of the identities of parties who
orchestrate or support artificial grassroots efforts. Harriss intimates that
Congress has the right, with regard to lobbying activities, to ask “who is
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.”261 McConnell
furthers this notion and suggests that Congress can require identity
disclosure because it will provide the public with meaningful information
252

2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(2).
Id. § 1604(c); S. 1, 110th Cong. § 220(d)(1) (2007).
254
See 2 U.S.C. § 1605(4) (stating that registrations and reports will be “[made] available for
public inspection and copying”).
255
514 U.S. 334 (1995).
256
See id. at 355 (concluding that disclosure of expenditures and their uses reveals far less
information than does disclosure of a name or identity).
257
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
258
See id. at 201 (agreeing with the District Court that BCRA’s disclosure requirements did not
prevent any persons or groups from speaking).
259
See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49 (“[I]n the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who
is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader’s
ability to evaluate the document’s message.”).
260
Id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 219
(suggesting that “corporate participation in an alleged grassroots effort to sway public policy” would be
a circumstance for which the interest in identity disclosure is greater).
261
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
253
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with which to evaluate Astroturf campaigns.
4. Penalties for Noncompliance
The amended Lobbying Disclosure Act increased the penalties for
failure to comply with lobbying disclosure requirements. Under the former
system, lobbyists who knowingly failed to abide by the federal disclosure
provisions would be subject to a fine of upwards of $50,000.262 The
amended statute, however, raises the potential fine to $200,000 and
stipulates that anyone who “knowingly and corruptly” fails to meet
disclosure demands will incur a prison sentence of as much as five years.263
Had the Senate bill become law, the new sanctions for noncompliance
would have applied to direct lobbying activities and to paid attempts to
stimulate grassroots lobbying.
Criminalizing deliberate failure to comply with disclosure orders, in
regard to the proposed grassroots lobbying laws, could pose constitutional
problems.
Since FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life264 invalidated
BCRA’s criminal treatment of issue-advocate-sponsored electioneering
communications, the argument follows that similar rules in the context of
grassroots lobbying would amount to regulation of issue advocacy, which
would not be the least restrictive means of addressing Astroturfing.265
Thus, if the suggested thresholds for disclosure of paid efforts to stimulate
grassroots lobbying were to capture true issue advocates, then the criminal
sanctions provision for failure to comply with these demands may not be
lawful—indeed, Broadrick v. Oklahoma266 may suggest that the statute
would fail to regulate in a “noncensorial” manner.267 But this would
depend on whether the proposed legislation would have treated issue
advocates as parties retained to engage in Astroturfing. When combined
with the other criteria for disclosure, it appears that the “retained by
clients” requirement would have sufficiently distinguished parties who
partake in genuine issue advocacy from those who imitate it.268 This point
aside, the Supreme Court in Harriss upheld FRLA as applied to artificial
262

Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006).
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 211(a), 2007
U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735, 749 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1606).
264
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
265
See Sekulow & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 176 (arguing that Wisconsin Right to Life
establishes that the regulation of grassroots issue advocacy is not a narrowly-tailored means of attaining
a compelling governmental interest).
266
413 U.S. 601 (1973).
267
Id. at 614–15 (“[O]verbreadth scrutiny has generally been somewhat less rigid in the context of
statutes regulating conduct in the shadow of the First Amendment, but doing so in a neutral,
noncensorial manner.” (citations omitted)).
268
See Press Release, OMB Watch, Opponents of Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Are Wrong
About Impact on Nonprofits (Jan. 12, 2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/print/3138 (arguing that the
disclosure provisions of the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act would strictly apply to
“lobby firms, advertisers and lobbyists that exceed significant dollar thresholds”).
263
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issue advocacy without voiding the Act’s criminal sanctions for failure to
comply with disclosure orders.269 Furthermore, the court in Commission
on Independent Colleges & Universities v. New York Temporary State
Commission on Regulation of Lobbying270 a similar statute criminalizing
“wilful” failure to disclose certain indirect lobbying activities, finding that
the law’s definition of “lobbying” did not extend mandatory disclosure to
“any remote indirect activity to influence legislation.”271
B. Additional Matters for Consideration
1. Role of Ethics
With no federal grassroots lobbying laws in place, the primary
responsibility for addressing the influence of special interests in the
lobbying process resides with the public relations industry and lobbyists
themselves.272 Accomplishment of this task hence depends on the ability
of lobbyists and lobbying firms to check the actions of one another. Even
though public relations societies and lobbying leagues have incorporated
into their codes of ethics provisions discouraging their members from
adopting the tactics of issue advocates, such codes do not proscribe
Astroturfing, and any adherence to them is voluntary. The lack of power
to compel organization members to abstain from artificial grassroots
advocacy thus makes achieving compliance virtually impossible.273
Neither house of Congress gave much consideration to the ethical
dimension of grassroots lobbying legislation. A possible addition to the
Senate proposal would have been a section outlining the expected conduct
of professional lobbyists—which would more or less borrow from present
codes of lobbying and public relations ethics—advising lobbyists that they
should not resort to Astroturf lobbying in order to further the interests of
clients. The Senate could then have specified that failure to abide by these
guidelines will result in expulsion from any organized lobbying groups of
which violators are members, as well as a ban on joining any such
associations. A provision like this would make the lobbying industry’s
task of identifying and dealing with parties that participate in deceptive
activities more efficient, as the industry would now have a statutory
backstop for assistance, and would encourage greater self-auditing by

269
The Court specifically stated that, if the criminal prohibition in FRLA were to be found
unconstitutional, the statute’s civil penalties could still stand, but it did not declare the prohibition
unlawful. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 627 (1954).
270
534 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
271
Id. at 492, 502.
272
Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note 14, at 220.
273
See RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES 196 (2009) (“[I]t
is probable that for lobbyists . . . self-regulation without any government supervision will not work.”).
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lobbyists whose activities may represent pseudo-grassroots lobbying.274
Such a provision may, however, arouse overbreadth concerns, making it
necessary to incorporate into future grassroots lobbying legislation a
concise definition of “professional lobbyist.”
A more severe measure than the above suggestion would be criminal
punishment. This option would essentially do away with much of the
Senate’s proposed disclosure requirements. Yet, since criminalization
would operate as a total prohibition on the ability of certain parties to
lobby the government, there is a reasonable probability that it would not be
constitutional. The Supreme Court has not formally recognized a
constitutional right to lobby, but it has suggested that lobbying activities
involve, to some degree, freedom of petition.275 And while the Court has
not specifically extended this finding to Astroturfing, the right of petition
for lobbyists, at present, would most likely cover Astroturfing because
such activity nevertheless is a form of lobbying.276 It would seem that a
provision prohibiting artificial grassroots advocacy altogether, even if
steeped in ethical considerations, would violate the First Amendment as it
pertains to lobbyists,277 despite the government’s compelling interest in
addressing the practice.
A monetary fine for creating false grassroots campaigns, on the other
hand, would not operate as a criminal bar against lobbying activities, and
lobbyists would still have the right to lobby directly on behalf of clients.
To foster cooperation with the guidelines on the ethical conduct
recommended above, the Senate could have devised a system of fines
corresponding percentage-wise with the amount a lobbyist spends on or
receives for Astroturf lobbying, set at a level sufficient to cause lobbyists
to reconsider plans to deceive the public and elected officials. In fact, to
274

Even without a provision like this, lobbyists should scrutinize their activities to ensure that
they are not engaging in conduct that may constitute Astroturfing. Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, supra note
14, at 222.
275
See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)
(“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights . . . . [T]he Sherman Act
does not apply to the activities of the railroads . . . insofar as those activities comprised mere
solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”). The
decision in Noerr may stand for the proposition that Congress cannot address Astroturfing by treating it
as a felony or misdemeanor, but the case deals with the reach of an antitrust statute, not the scope of a
lobbying law. Moreover, Noerr does not suggest that Harriss was wrong as to Congress’s right to seek
disclosure of artificially stimulated letter campaigns.
276
See Luneburg & Spitzer, supra note 48, at 57 (finding that an “‘artificially stimulated letter
campaign,’” being a “‘direct’” communication with elected officials, is a type of lobbying (quoting
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954))); Thomas, supra note 85, at 185 (arguing that
lobbying, “even in its most distasteful forms, has always been a popular means of petitioning American
government officials,” and that the Founders likely deemed lobbying worthy of First Amendment, right
of petition defense).
277
See Thomas, supra note 85, at 186–87 (“Any court applying an original intent analysis of the
right of petition would be forced to declare . . . statutes [prohibiting lobbying activities]
unconstitutional, as violative of the First Amendment right of petition . . . .”).
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account for resource inequalities, the Senate should have used a similar
method in setting the current civil penalty for failure to comply with the
revised Lobbying Disclosure Act instead of a fixed quantity of $200,000.278
2. “Size-of-Contribution-Only”
Contributors

Requirement

for

Disclosure

of

Another matter involves simplification of the standards for disclosure
of contributors to Astroturf campaigns. Had the provisions regarding paid
efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying become law, parties that engage in
Astroturfing would have needed to divulge the names and contact
information of organizations that, in addition to contributing at least $5,000
to these causes, “actively [participate] in [their] planning, supervision or
control.”279 Yet the Senate included no standard in the proposal, and no
standard presently exists, for deducing whether a contributor to Astroturf
efforts qualifies as an active participant. One way to address this matter
would be to classify as active participants parties whose time and money
devoted to an Astroturf campaign exceed a certain proportion of the total
time and money they contribute to lobbying efforts in general in a calendar
year.280 But difficulties in accurately quantifying the amount of time and
money a party spends on each lobbying activity it undertakes would
complicate this idea.
A better approach would have been to eliminate the requirement that
the contributing party substantially involve itself in formulating,
overseeing or managing an Astroturf movement—and thus institute a
“size-of-contribution-only” standard, where parties would only need to
contribute above a certain quantity to trigger disclosure. The $5,000
contribution threshold carries with it the implied notion that persons and
groups that direct substantial funds toward artificial grassroots activities
probably play, or would like to play, an active role in seeing that these
activities accomplish their objectives. McConnell may support a “size-ofcontribution-only” standard for contributors to Astroturf lobbying. While
the disclosure mandate that McConnell upheld involved electioneering
communications and not grassroots lobbying, that provision nevertheless
278
As Professor Krishnakumar observes, a set penalty represents a mere “drop in the bucket” for
numerous lobbyists and special interests, and would be “far less effective than . . . fines based on a
percentage of lobbying income or lobbying expenditures.” Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 556–57.
279
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 207(a)(1), 2007
U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) 735, 747 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3)). Despite the absence of the
grassroots lobbying provisions in the final version of the Lobbying Transparency and Accountability
Act, the $5,000 contributor-disclosure threshold remained in place and currently applies to lobbying in
general. Id.
280
Current lobbying laws seem to employ a similar method in defining “lobbyist,” classifying as
not a lobbyist an individual “whose lobbying activities constitute less than [twenty] percent of the time
engaged in the services provided by such individual to [a given client] over a [three]-month period.”
§ 201(b)(1), 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. (121 Stat.) at 742 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10)).
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required disclosure only after contributions exceeded a specified amount; it
did not further require that the contributor actively partake in planning or
directing the communication.281
Congress should also consider several other matters with respect to the
disclosure of individuals and organizations that contribute to Astroturfing.
First, regardless of whether Congress were to employ a “size-ofcontribution-only” standard in drafting grassroots lobbying legislation, it
should at least clarify that the $5,000 threshold refers to total, not
individual, contributions—or else certain parties could avoid disclosure by
repeatedly contributing less than $5,000. Further, the statute could require
disclosure of each individual contribution once a party exceeds $5,000 in
net donated funds so that citizens may gauge which parties contribute most
substantially to Astroturf campaigns.
3. Extending Accountability to Clients
Finally, grassroots lobbying legislation should hold clients accountable
for Astroturfing, an area on which the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act and the grassroots lobbying proposals placed little to no
emphasis. This may be attributable to the fact that, oftentimes, lobbyists
have discretion over which forms of lobbying they will employ and the
intensity of their lobbying efforts.282 Nevertheless, in many cases
individuals and organizations contact lobbyists or public relations firms
with the aim of having an Astroturf campaign initiated on their behalf.283
Such clients authorize lobbyists to engage in activity which the
government has a compelling interest in addressing. Because lobbyists
compensated to generate Astroturf campaigns act as agents for their
clients, grassroots lobbying legislation should contain provisions outlining
the consequences of this conduct for those clients who express interest in
such campaigns.
The best means of holding clients accountable for the actions of hired
lobbyists appears to be through an extension of the suggested fine on
lobbyists to clients. For clients who intentionally seek lobbyists for
Astroturf campaigns, the same recommended fine—a percentage of total
income from or expenses for lobbying services large enough to deter
artificial grassroots advocacy—could apply. For clients who do not intend
for hired lobbyists to pursue efforts to stimulate grassroots activity, a
smaller percentage fine could apply. A sizable fine would discourage
clients from offering to pay lobbyists to generate inauthentic issue
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advocacy. Furthermore, it may persuade lobbyists to employ traditional
direct lobbying practices rather than grassroots strategies to fulfill the goals
of their clients, if they want to retain the business of these entities and
prevent possible damage to their reputations and those of their clients.
Again, a criminal penalty does not appear workable because it may
function as an outright prohibition of lobbying activities (albeit in a more
indirect fashion in this case), possibly raising fears about the ability of
lobbyists to adequately exercise their right of petition. Similarly, given
this concern, it would be inequitable to criminally punish clients but not
the parties that perform the actual Astroturfing.
V. CONCLUSION
Astroturf lobbying has grown in popularity over the years and has
proven effective at swaying public opinion on matters of political
significance. Despite its questionable features, special interest groups,
corporations, affluent individuals, and lobbyists will not be quick to
abandon the practice anytime soon. Perhaps the most obvious reason for
this is congressional failure to implement legislation which will bring
artificial grassroots advocacy to light, even though the Supreme Court and
lower courts have noted that there is a compelling governmental interest in
the exposure and control of this activity. Legislation critics understandably
fear that statutory efforts to identify fake grassroots activities will constrain
the ability of genuine issue advocates to fully exercise their First
Amendment rights. Yet case law on state-level efforts to address Astroturf
lobbying, as well as Supreme Court findings in the context of electionbased speech, demonstrate that these fears are inflated or unfounded, and
that federal legislation would promote diverse and fully-informed public
discourse on the issues of the day.
That Congress has introduced grassroots lobbying bills in recent years,
even if these proposals have not resulted in binding laws, is encouraging.
But whether it will consider potential legislation again in the near future is
unclear. If and when it does, it may look to some of the standards from
and mandates of the 2007 proposals for guidance. It should also give
serious thought to ethical guidelines for lobbyist conduct, percentage-based
fines for engagement in Astroturfing, and means of holding parties that
request Astroturf campaigns accountable for their decisions. In any event,
the continuing prevalence of Astroturfing in modern lobbying shows that
the time is right for Congress to not only grapple with the matter again, but
to approach it with a greater commitment to meaningful reform.

